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Determinants of Voluntary Corporate Disclosures by UK Companies 
 
Abstract 
This paper models the arrival rate of voluntary news announcements made by UK 
firms, and investigates whether the UK’s new regulatory regime following the 
establishment of the Financial Services Authority’s affected the pattern of corporate 
news disclosures. We also investigate whether a firm’s earnings environment affects 
the volume of news announcements that the firm releases to the stock market. Our 
results show that firms make more voluntary disclosures, at those times when the 
firm’s actual earnings per share are less than the earnings expected by the market but 
that we find no conclusive evidence that the new regulatory regime had any impact on 
disclosure practices. 
Keywords: information releases, corporate disclosure, news management 
JEL Classification: M40, G18 
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I Introduction 
This paper investigates voluntary disclosure practices by UK firms, and examines 
whether the regulatory regime introduced under the Financial Services and Market 
Act (FSMA) 2000 had an impact on disclosure practices. We also study whether the 
forthcoming release of a negative earnings surprise affects managerial disclosure 
practices.  
 
Annual report disclosure practices by managers have been extensively examined  in 
the literature (Cooke and Wallace, 1990; Meek, Gray and Roberts, 1995; Ahmed and 
Courtis, 1999; O’Sullivan, 2000; Adams, 2002; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; 
Stanton and Stanton, 2002; Watson, Shrives and Marston, 2002).. However, research 
into the release of other more timely forms of communications, such as outlook 
statements, is an emerging area in the UK which offers useful insights into factors that 
affect disclosure practices more generally (Dedman, 2004). The importance of 
outlook statements has been highlighted by previous work that has shown significant 
market reactions to the announcements of these outlook statements (Collet, 2004; 
Helbork and Walker, 2003, Clare, 2004).  In addition, there is evidence that these 
statements are predictors of the economic outlook of a country (Clare, 2004), and 
therefore important in macroeconomic policy choices. 
 
Research on US firms into the managerial motivation for disclosures, points toward 
managers facing an asymmetric loss function in their earnings disclosure practices: 
managers are keen to pre-empt a negative earnings surprise while the same is not 
observed when the earnings surprise is positive. An earnings surprise is defined as a 
situation when the actual earnings released by a company is different from the 
consensus analyst forecast of the expected earnings. Reasons put forward for the 
asymmetric loss function include the litigation costs (Skinner, 1994; Francis and 
Schiper, 1999; Soffer et al, 2000), investor reputation (Skinner, 1994; Kasnik and 
Lev, 1995) and the effect of not disclosing information on stock prices (Soffer et al , 
2000).  While the US and UK share a number of similar features such as legal 
systems, share ownership patterns and sound investor protection systems (La Porta et 
al, 1998, 1999 and 2000), researchers have questioned whether US based findings can 
be generalised in a UK context (Hudaib and Cooke, 2005; Beattie, 2006). For instance 
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though the legal system is similar in both countries, the threat of litigation is much 
stronger in the US than it is in the UK (Elliot and Jacobson, 1994, Dedman, 2004).  
 
The UK Listing Authority (UKLA) first issued its guidelines on the dissemination of 
price sensitive information in 1994, and since then there have been changes in the 
regulatory framework with the Financial Services Authority (FSA) taking over 
responsibility for the UKLA from the London Stock Exchange in 2000 and the 
introduction of tougher US style penalties for non-disclosure of price sensitive 
information through the Financial Services and Market Act (FSMA) of 2000.   
 
Under the FSA guidelines (FSMA, 2000) UK company directors are required to 
disclose price sensitive information immediately to the stock market. Price sensitive 
information is defined as. when there is a change in the financial or operating 
condition of a business that is not currently reflected in stock prices. However 
managers may exercise their discretion in deciding whether the information is price 
sensitive (Collet, 2004) and the guidelines on the dissemination of price sensitive 
information does not give clear guidelines on what constitutes a significant impact on 
stock prices. Since managers have to exercise their judgement in the disclosure of 
outlook statements we classify these as voluntary disclosures.  Collet (2004) provides 
a descriptive review of the content and market reaction of trading statements released 
by companies, but does not focus specifically on examining managerial motives for 
disclosure. Helbrok and Walker (2003) focus only on the profit warnings area of 
disclosure and provide evidence on factors which contribute to the release of profit 
warnings. We extend this literature by examining director motivation for disclosure of 
all outlook statements using a broad sample of listed companies in the UK and split 
our sample to incorporate the time period surrounding the imposition of stricter 
penalties for non disclosure of price sensitive information. 1 
 
Our classification of news announcements differs from some of the extant literature. 
Previous work that has examined earnings related disclosure uses a subjective content 
                                                 
1 Examples of outlook statements include those  released on the  4th of September 1996 by Cadbury-
Schweppes with the heading “the outlook for the year as a whole is good” and issued by  BP on the 14th 
of February 1995 with the heading  “Pressure on Margins - Depressed refining margins are likely to 
continue into 1998”.  Additional details are typically provided to enhance the statement. 
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analysis approach to classify the announcements into negative, neutral or positive 
statements. While such an approach has the advantage of enabling readers to 
appreciate the type of announcement (quantitative or qualitative) as well as the 
broader context of the announcement, it does require a subjective decision making 
process (see Beattie et al, 2004 for a further discussion of the problems involved in 
content analysis).2  Instead our approach classifies all news statements as negative, 
neutral or positive based on the impact of the disclosure of the statement on market 
prices, hence using a more objective market based measure of disclosure.  Our paper 
also responds to Dedman (2004) in examining the effect of litigation on disclosure 
practices by breaking our sample into the periods before and after the FSA enacted the 
financial services and market act (FSMA, 2000).   
 
We do find evidence of a linear increase in disclosure over time but do not find 
evidence that regulation by the FSA was associated with a change in disclosure 
behaviour. After controlling for company size, analyst following and gearing we find 
evidence of increased disclosure of outlook statements when companies have negative 
news (earnings information) to disclose to the market.   
 
The rest of the paper is divided into the following sections. Section 2 describes the 
regulatory environment applicable to the disclosure of news information and the 
hypothesis associated with that. Section 3 develops the testable hypotheses 
concerning managerial behaviour and disclosure practices. In section 4 we describe 
the data used in the study, section 5 presents the results and discussion of the results. 
Finally, our conclusions are summarised in section 6.  
  
II The Regulatory Framework for the dissemination of price sensitive information 
 
In recent years in the UK there have been a number of regulatory changes in relation 
to the disclosure of material information to shareholders. Prior to 1994 there were few 
specific guidelines on the disclosure of non-mandatory corporate information.  UK 
companies were and still are dominated by institutional investors, and pre-1994 used 
                                                 
2 Collet (2004) provides examples of the  problems involved in the subjective classification which 
include disagreement among users, insignificant details provided for classification (pg 8), categories 
being positive on one aspect and negative on other aspects making classification problematic (pg 26) 
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private channels to transmit price sensitive information to shareholders (Holland, 
1997, Helbork and Walker, 2002). In 1994 the United Kingdom Listing Authority 
(UKLA) published guidance on the dissemination of price sensitive information. 
Under these rules listed companies are under an obligation to ensure that any price 
sensitive information which comes from itself, its advisors or agents with the listed 
company’s authority, be presented to the market as a whole and must be sufficient, 
accurate and not misleading3. The UKLA defines price sensitive information as 
information which may or would be likely to lead to a substantial movement in the 
price of the company’s listed securities. This definition depends on a variety of factors 
such as size, sector, and recent developments. Examples of these factors include 
dividend announcements, board appointments or departures, profit warnings, share 
dealings by directors or substantial shareholders, acquisitions and disposals above a 
certain size, annual and interim results, preliminary results, rights issues and details of 
other issues of securities. Directors of companies have ultimate responsibility for the 
dissemination of the news announcements, though it is expected that they would 
delegate such functions within the firm. Companies usually submit news 
announcements to a regulatory news service. A Regulatory Information Service is a 
service that receives regulatory information from listed companies (and other 
entities), processes that information and disseminates it to Secondary Information 
Providers.  
 
In May 2000 the Financial Services Authority (FSA) took over supervision of the 
UKLA from the London Stock Exchange. The establishment of the FSA was 
announced in 1997, with the intention of strengthening financial services regulation in 
the United Kingdom, and was given its market powers by the Financial Services and 
Market Act of 2000 (FSMA).4 The FSMA required the FSA to publish a code to 
supplement the statutory provisions defining market abuse providing more guidelines 
than was previously available. The code known as the “Code of Market Conduct” or 
                                                 
3 Listing rules paragraph (9.1) states that “a company must notify the company announcement office 
(cao) without any delay of any new major development within its sphere of activity which are not 
public knowledge..” 
4 The establishment of a super-regulator followed a series of high profile financial scandals during the 
eighties and nineties including Barlow-Clowes, 1988,  Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
(BCCI),1991, Barings,1995, Blue Arrow (1987, Guinness, 1986. In 1997 the new Labour Government 
proposed the establishment of the FSA as a new super-regulator, that would subsume in one regulatory 
organization a number of previously existing financial regulators. 
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the “Code” came into effect on 1st December 2001. Both the FSMA and the Code set 
out new frameworks for tackling market abuse in prescribed markets expected to be 
those operated by the seven UK recognized investment exchanges5. Transparency and 
disclosure of information by companies is one of the cornerstones of the market abuse 
regime focusing on three key areas, misuse of information, false or misleading 
impression and market distortion. The FSMA states that  
 
“Any person who does not act or engages in any course of conduct 
which creates a false or misleading impression as to the market in or the 
price or value of any relevant investments is guilty of an offence if he 
does so for the purpose of creating that impression and of thereby 
inducing another person to acquire, dispose of, subscribe for or 
otherwise those investments or to refrain from doing so or to exercise, 
or refrain from exercising, any rights conferred by those investments 
(FSMA, 2000, s.397, cited in Dedman, 2004)” 
 
 
One of the policy effects of the FSMA was the introduction of civil penalties (fines 
and suspensions) for market abuse which run parallel to criminal offences and which 
requires a lower burden of proof6.  Prior to the code the toughest penalty that could be 
imposed was a public censure while currently indefinite exclusion or an unlimited fine 
can be levied. For instance in 2000/01 the enforcement division of the FSA imposed 
79 penalties with a total value of £5,847,748. For the year 2001/02 that number 
decreased to 76 but the value of the penalties increased to £10,062,5977. 
 
In research that examines the effect of the UKLA’s 1994 guidance on disclosure 
Helbrok and Walker (2002) note an increase in the frequency of profit warnings by 
listed companies after 1994. Holland (1994, 1996) also provides evidence of a change 
in disclosure policies after 1994 suggesting that the guidance notes has had a real 
effect on disclosure practices. Holland (1999) notes that whilst private information 
channels still serve as an important source of communication between companies and 
                                                 
5 For a more detailed description of the measures which the FSA has taken to prepare for taking on full                                      
responsibility as the single regulator of financial services see ‘The Financial Services Authority: A 
short guide to our preparations for the new regulatory regime’.  
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/P28.pdf 
 
6 See sections 118-123 of the FSMA 2000 
7 More details on the FSA’s enforcement policies can be found at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/doing/regulated/law/focus/ 
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institutional investors, companies are keen to disclose price sensitive information 
through public channels first before further discussions with institutional investors. 
 
Helbrok and Walker (2003) using a sample of 345 companies over the time period 
1992-1995 show that the introduction of guidelines on the dissemination of price 
sensitive information led to an increase in the frequency of trading statements released 
by companies. Our sample extends into the period after the FSA took over 
responsibility for the UKLA from the London Stock Exchange and thereby offers the 
opportunity of examining the impact of the threat of litigation on disclosure practices. 
  
The first period in our study covers the time period (1994-1997), after the introduction 
of the UKLA guidance on price sensitive information, but before the establishment of 
the FSA. The second period covers the three years period after the FSMA was 
implemented and the threat of litigation for the non-disclosure of price sensitive 
information was tightened. The first hypothesis that we test in the paper is  
 
Hypothesis 1: The increased threat of litigation after the establishment of the 
FSA resulted in an increase in voluntary disclosures by companies  
 
By focusing on the two time periods before and after the implementation of the 
FSMA, following Dedman (2004), this paper investigates the effect of the threat of 
litigation on disclosure practices in UK companies. 
 
III Managerial Behaviour and Disclosure Practices 
 
In an early study that examined managerial motives for the voluntary disclosure of 
earnings news, Truman (1986) argues that managers release information voluntarily 
as a means of signalling their ability to anticipate future earnings changes. Ajiinkya 
and Gift (1984) examined the hypothesis that managers dislike any large earnings 
surprises, and therefore disclose more information regardless of whether the news 
carried positive or negative information in line with Truman (1986). Their study along 
with McNichols (1989), Pownall, Wasley and Waymire (1993) show a stock market 
reaction close to zero when voluntary news announcements are released suggesting no 
earnings bias in voluntary disclosure. Other studies show that managers have a 
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tendency to disclose more good news forecasts than bad news forecasts (Patell, 1976; 
Penman, 1980;  Lev and Penman, 1990). 
 
More recent studies however show a bias in the opposite direction, and find that 
managers disclose more bad news forecasts than good news forecasts. Skinner (1994, 
1997) argues that managers are faced with an asymmetric loss function in their 
voluntary disclosure practices. Managers are faced with large costs only when 
investors are surprised with negative news. Two additional arguments for an 
asymmetric loss function have been proposed. The first is related to legal liability 
costs as a result of the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s rule 10b-5 which 
makes it unlawful for managers to omit or state a material fact. By pre-disclosing the 
information, managers reduced the risk of being sued by investors for withholding 
information. Secondly Skinner argues that managers pre-disclose negative earnings 
news in order to avoid reputation costs. Managers who develop a history of earnings 
surprises tend to be followed less by the money management community, which 
would adversely affect the price and liquidity of the stock.  Skinner’s findings are 
confirmed by other US based studies (Kaznik and Lev, 1995; Soffer et al, 2001)  that 
find that managers are conservative in their disclosure practices.  Libby and Tan 
(1999) in their survey of financial analysts found that analysts perceived managers 
who provided early warning signals as having more integrity and that analysts tend to 
follow stocks of companies that were more forthcoming with their disclosures. 
Matsumoto (2002) argues that managers can broadly use two techniques to avoid a 
negative earnings surprise. These are to manage the actual earnings or the 
expectations of earnings.  Managing expectations of earnings would be easier due to 
the presence of boards and auditors (Matsumoto, 2002).  
 
Share price impact is another factor that may motivate managerial disclosure 
decisions. Brown at al (1987) show that managers have strong incentives to avoid 
negative earnings surprises because it leads to negative price reactions. Skinner and 
Sloan (2001) show that the absolute magnitude of the price response to negative 
surprises exceeds the price response to positive earnings surprise.  Payne and Robb 
(2001) show that firms who pre-manage news disclosure have greater abnormal 
returns. 
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For UK companies, Collet (2004) conducts a study of trading statements using data 
from FTSE All Share Companies for the time period 1995-2001 and confirms that the 
releases of trading statements have a significant impact on stock prices, with a bigger 
reaction to the release of negative updates.  Helbrok and Walker (2003) using a 
sample of 345 companies over the time period 1992-1995 report that the introduction 
of guidelines on the dissemination of price sensitive information led to an increase in 
the frequency of trading statements released by companies. In examining the impact 
of market expectation on the disclosure of trading statements Helbrok and Walker 
(2003) show that managers release trading statements in order to avoid negative 
earnings surprise. 
 
While this paper maintains the sprit of Helbrok and Walker (2003), our sample 
includes all companies in the FTSE All Share category (734 in all).  This covers a 
larger cross section of companies, and enables us to examine differences in disclosure 
patterns across stocks that are components of different indices. Within the FTSE All 
Share index, stocks may be grouped into three sub-indices based on stcok market 
liquidity: FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and FTSE Small. Collet (2004) finds that the market 
reaction to trading statements is greater for companies in smaller indices. He 
attributes this to these companies having a lower analyst following. This serves as our 
motivation for examining disclosure practices across stocks grouped by index which 
also acts as a measure of stock market liquidity. 
 
Our second hypothesis examined is whether managers are influenced by the 
forthcoming release of an earnings surprise in choosing their disclosure practices and 
whether the direction of the earnings surprise biases disclosure decisions 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is no relationship between the value of the forthcoming 
release of an earnings surprise and disclosure practices of companies. 
 
The level of voluntary disclosure may systematically vary across firms due to other 
factors than the regulatory regime, and the earnings environment, so our study also 
controls for size, analyst following and gearing. Firm size has been one of the key 
characteristics consistently noted in previous research as being positively related to 
the volume of corporate disclosure. For example, Ahmed and Courtis (1999) in their 
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meta-analysis of corporate characteristics and annual report disclosure levels   
between 1968 and 1997 analyzed 29 papers, which included 2,473 annual reports. The 
meta-analysis concluded that evidence for links between the various economic 
variables and disclosure were mixed with strong support only for size, listing status 
and leverage (all of them positive). Larger firms release more information due to the 
scale of their operations and the financial capability to do so. When more analysts 
follow a company there will be more demands for information from the company 
(Healey and Palepu, 2001) and therefore it can be expected that firms with a larger 
analyst following will disclose more information to satisfy analysts’ information 
demands.  
 
Dedman and Lin (2002) and Helbok and Walker (2003) show that the capital structure 
of a company can have an influence on its disclosure practices. Their studies find that 
firms with higher gearing ratios disclose less price sensitive information to the 
markets. Ahmed and Courtis (1999) on the other hand find a positive relationship 
between gearing and annual report disclosure.  
 
All of these control variables have been used in prior work on the disclosure of 
outlook statements (Skinner, 1994; Kaznik and Lev, 1995; Soffer et al, 2002; Ahmed 
and Courtis, 1999; Collet, 2004). One drawback of previous studies that have 
examined the effect of litigation on disclosure practices is the lack of control for time-
specific factors which affect corporate disclosure practices (see Fried 1976; Stigler, 
1964; Beaston, 1973; Collet 2004).  Our study addresses this issue by incorporating a 
background increase in news announcements, as Figure 1 demonstrates that 
throughout the period there has been a gradual increase in disclosures, and this might 
be unrelated to the introduction of the FSMA (2000). 
 
IV Data 
 
Our dataset comprises the complete set of news announcements made by the FTSE 
All share firms for the accounting base years 1994-1997 and 2000-2002 to cover the 
period after the guidance notes on the disclosure of price sensitive information were 
released in 1994, but before the establishment of the FSA, and the period after the 
FSA was given market powers. Data on the type of Regulatory News Service 
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Announcements as well as the date of the news and earnings announcement made by 
the FTSE All Share Companies was obtained from Hemscot Premium Services.8 
Table 1 contains preliminary descriptive results for the frequency counts of 
Regulatory News Service (RNS) statements released by the FTSE All Share 
companies over the two time periods: pre-FSA and post-FSA. Despite having a 
shorter observation period in the post-FSA period (3 years as opposed to 4 years in 
the pre-FSA period), there is a substantial increase in the number of RNS 
announcements in the post-FSA period. The total number of news items in the first 
period is 14,759 while in the second it is 28,708.  This is an increase of 159% news 
items per year between the two sub-periods.   
 
All  RNS statements made by the FTSE All-Share companies have been broken down 
into six categories, summarised in Table 1. It can be seen that the 11,928 RNS outlook 
statements are the largest category of news types. Outlook statements issued by 
companies are the main focus of this study as these have the characteristics of a 
voluntary corporate disclosure (Collet, 2004) and relate to the future trading 
environment of a company. The pattern in total numbers of outlook statements and the 
number of outlook statements per company is given in Figure 1.  Both curves show a 
steady upwards trend. 
 
In our analysis we concentrate on the outlook statements released in the six months 
prior to the announcement of the year-end earnings per share. This allows us to focus 
on final year-end earnings related voluntary disclosures, rather than semi-annual 
interim earnings releases. This enables us to align our measure of market expectations 
(based on forecasts made in the six months prior to the year-end earnings release) 
with the release of RNS outlook statements. Otherwise there is some confusion as to 
whether the outlook statement in the first half of the accounting year relates to the 
disclosure of the interim earnings announcement or the final year-end earnings. Table 
1 also provides information on the total number of RNS statements made six months 
prior to the release of the year end earnings announcement.  
 
                                                 
8 Hemscot which provides business and financial news obtains regulatory news service announcements 
from the London stock exchange 
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We categorise outlook statements as positive or negative following the market 
reaction to the announcement, using methods of statistical process control. 
(Montgomery, 2004).  Statistical Process Control, or SPC, is an approach to 
monitoring series gathered over time.  The relevance of new data is compared the 
historical distribution of results gathered earlier.  In process control applications any 
result outside three standard deviations from the mean indicates that a significant 
event had occurred.9  A full SPC approach would also include rules for trends and 
repeated observations on the same side of the mean in addition to extreme value 
screening.  We use a simpler rule which classifies an adjusted return as important if it 
is outside one standard deviation from the mean.  The mean and standard deviations 
were calculated monthly for each stock to account for variations in volatility over 
time.  Under an assumption of normality we would expect 15.9% of announcements 
to be flagged as negative and positive by chance alone using a one standard deviation 
window.  If news releases contain price sensitive information, then there should be an 
association between days on which extreme values are observed, and days on which 
RNS statements are released. 
 
 
We follow standard practice and calculate earnings surprise by comparing the realised 
earnings per share (EPS) with analyst forecast earnings per share for the company. 
More precisely, an earnings surprise is calculated as the difference between the 
consensuses forecast six months prior to the release of the EPS and the actual EPS 
standardised by the share price six months prior to the release of the EPS. We follow 
Kaznik and Lev (1995) and define good news as a positive earnings surprise and bad 
news as a negative earnings surprise. The mean market capitalisation over the year is 
used as a proxy for the size of the company. Gearing is calculated as a firm’s total 
debt divided by total assets and analyst following is calculated as the number of 
analysts who issued earnings forecasts during the year for a firm on the I/B/E/S 
                                                 
9 In a manufacturing situation the SPC rules used will depend on the effort available to respond to SPC 
failures.  A large number of control charts would result in an unmanageable task.  Results as extreme as 
three standard deviations from the mean occurs only 0.27% of the time.  This contrasts to the 5% level 
level of significance often encountered in statistics.  As Montgomery (2004) explains, to detect shifts 
and trends in an underlying distribution, a full SPC approach would also include rules for trends and 
repeated observations on the same side of the mean in addition to extreme value screening.  
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database. Year-end earnings per share, market capitalisation, price, analysts’ median 
consensus forecasts, gearing, analyst following were all extracted from Datastream. 
 
 
 
V Results 
 
Descriptive Information 
Table 2 contains some descriptive statistics on the average number of outlook 
statements released per company per year by index category. Outlook statements have 
also been classified into positive, neutral and negative statements over the two sub-
periods, based on the stock market reaction on the day of the announcement, and p-
values have been calculated for the differences between positive and negative 
statements.  As expected companies in the most liquid index (FTSE 100) have the 
highest disclosure rate. The results show that the number of negative statements 
issued by the FTSE 100 companies are significantly higher than the number of 
positive statements in both the pre-FSA (p-value of 0.00%) and the post-FSA periods 
(p-value of 0.03%).  There are no significant results on the differences between the 
two categories on the other index categories. These results suggest that companies in 
the most liquid index are biased toward disclosing news which the market perceives 
to be negative and this is the case in both sub-periods. Though not statistically 
significant, the point estimates show that smaller companies disclosed more positive 
news in the pre-FSA period but the proportion of negative news is higher in the post-
FSA period.10 The results also show an increased trend in all categories of disclosure 
for all the index categories in the second period.  
 
We also examined whether there are any time effects involved in the increased 
disclosure. Figure 2 provides information on the timing of the news announcements in 
the months leading up to the earnings release. While the frequency of news 
announcements increased in the post-FSA period, it appears that there is little 
difference in the timing of the news announcements with the highest occurrence one 
month prior to the earnings release which is when we expect managers to have the 
                                                 
10 The results over a one year period are similar in magnitude to the six month results except that 
smaller companies disclosed significantly more positive news in period 1.  
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most accurate information about the final earnings numbers. The next section 
examines the market reaction to the release of these outlook statements.  
 
Market Reaction 
Daily returns around each of the outlook statements made by the companies were 
obtained from Datastream. Excess returns and cumulative abnormal returns are 
calculated using market adjusted returns 
 
ARit = Rit – RMt 
 
Where Rit is the return on the stock i for day t and RMt is the return on the market 
portfolio using the FTSE All-Share index as the proxy for the market portfolio.  We 
calculate returns prior and post the news announcement by using an 11 day window (-
5 to -1 and +1 to +5 with 0 being the event date).  Examining periods prior to the 
release of the news announcements enables us to determine whether there is any 
evidence of leakage of price sensitive information prior to the public announcement of 
the news. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) are calculated for days -5 to -1 and 
days +1 to +5, as well as the average return on day 0.  
 
Table 3 provides information on the CAR prior to the announcement, on the day of 
the announcement and after the announcement, for negative, neutral and positive price 
sensitive information.  The table is broken down into two sections to reflect the time 
periods before and after the introduction of the FSMA 2000, in Panels A and B 
respectively. Results are provided for the FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and FTSE Small 
category as well as for the full sample. Comparative CAR results are also given for 
days on which no news announcement was made, which are also divided into 
Negative, Neutral and Positive price changes. The P-values report a test for 
differences in mean returns between news and no news days for the negative, neutral 
and positive price changes.  
 
The results show that the market reaction on announcement day to the news is 
asymmetric with a larger reaction to negative news releases than to positive news 
announcements.  In Panel A for the pre-FSA period, the mean announcement-day 
return for negative OTL announcements was -4.7%, and for positive OTL 
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announcements was +3.83%. Both of these mean returns are significantly different 
from the mean returns for negative and positive prices changes around non-news 
days. In Panel B, for the post-FSA period, the mean return was -8.39% and for 
positive announcements was 5.97%. This confirms previous findings in Skinner 
(1994), Kasnik and Lev (1995) and Collet (2004). The returns are higher in the post-
FSA period which may reflect the higher stock market volatility associated with that 
period.  
 
In the pre-FSA period there is no evidence of leakage of price sensitive information 
prior to the information disclosure.  However post-FSA, there is some evidence of 
price movements prior to the release of significant negative news among the FTSE 
All Share firms. Examination of the different index categories shows that this is due 
to leakage among the FTSE 250 group of companies.  In this group the mean excess 
return was -0.59 before bad news was released but 0.55 if no news was released and 
the excess returns were negative.  There were no differences seen in the FTSE 100 
and the FTSE Small group of firms.  
 
Mean CAR for the five days after the release of significant negative news statements 
are insignificant for both the full and the sub samples which provide no evidence of a 
delayed market reaction with respect to negative news announcements. On the other 
hand for significant positive news statements there is evidence of a positive and 
significant CAR’s for the total sample in both Panels A and B over the five days after 
the release of news statements. This finding provides support to news hypothesis in 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) that the market tends to under react to good news.  
 
Holland (1997) notes that companies hold meetings with institutional investors after 
the public release of news statements. If these meetings do provide value relevant 
information then the results suggest that companies with poor future earnings 
information to disclose, make full disclosure (perhaps to deter litigation and for 
reputation reasons), but those companies with positive news are not fully forthcoming 
in their public disclosures and therefore the private meeting serve as a forum to 
provide more value relevant information in the disclosure of good news,  
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The results also show that for both negative as well as for positive news 
announcements, the market reaction increases as the firm liquidity is reduced: the 
stock market reaction is larger for firms in FTSE 250 and FTSE Small indices. This 
confirms the results obtained in Collet (2004) and adds to the evidence that news 
announcements of smaller firms produce bigger surprises.  Collet (2004) notes that 
this is might be because large companies have other ways of disclosing news 
information to investors prior to the public release of the news. However, the results 
on the period prior to the announcement do not support this theory. Another possible 
explanation is that the large external coverage received by firms in the larger indexes 
leads to better anticipation of the news compared with firms in the smaller indexes 
hence leading to bigger reactions among the smaller companies.  
 
Regression Analysis 
The hypotheses in this study are also tested using a regression model.  The number of 
statements issued by a company can only take integer values (i.e. 0, 1, 2, 3 etc. news 
announcements per year).  A Poisson model is more appropriately fitted to this data 
than the more usual linear regression11.  Of central interest to our tests are the 
relationships between the disclosure of outlook statements and both the regulatory 
environment and the nature of the earnings surprise.  The following Poisson model is 
used to examine these relationships. 
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Pri,t(n=r) is the probability that for company i in year t, the observations (n) is equal 
to 0, 1 , 2 3, etc.  The quantity λ contains terms that include the explanatory variables. 
 
DFSMA =1 if Year is 2000-2002, and 0 otherwise. This dummy variable allows us to 
identify the effect of the introduction of the FSMA (2000) on disclosure practices. 
According to Hypothesis 1 we would expect an increase in the probability of news 
                                                 
11 OLS was explored and similar results were obtained. 
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disclosures in the post-FSA period, and therefore the coefficient on this variable 
should be significantly positive. 
 
ESurprisei,t is the difference between the consensuses forecast for company i in year t 
six months prior to the release of the EPS and the subsequent actual EPS standardised 
by the share price six months prior to the release of the EPS. This is the forecast error, 
and allows us to classify companies as being in a good news or bad news earnings 
environment. According to Hypothesis 2, there is no relationship between the 
earnings environment and the number of disclosures, and we would expect this 
variable to be insignificant in determining the probability of a disclosure. 
 
No_Analystsi,t is the number of analysts who issued earnings forecasts for company i 
during the year t and which is obtained from the  I/B/E/S database. This variable 
controls for the demand for corporate information by analysts. 
 
MarketCapi,t is the mean market capitalisation over the year for the company, and 
controls for the size of the company, since we would expect that larger companies 
have more pieces of information to release. 
 
Gearingi,t is  a firm’s total debt divided by total assets for year t, and we would expect 
the  capital structure to have an effect on disclosures, though the previous literature 
has suggested that the sign of this relationship is ambiguous. 
 
Yeart  is an indicator variable for the year in which the earnings were announced, and 
represents a time trend in the model. Including a time trend as well as a dummy 
variable for the introduction of the FSA, allows us to identify the incremental effect of 
the FSMA, over and above a general increase in disclosures. 
 
A summary of the modes for total news is given in the first columns of Table 4.  As 
expected the frequency of outlook statements is positively and significantly related to 
the size of a company and the number of analysts following the company. The 
estimated coefficient in the regression on gearing is positive and significant at the 1% 
level which provides evidence for a positive relationship between disclosure of 
outlook statements and gearing. There is evidence of disclosure increasing over time 
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as shown by the positive and significant coefficients of Year. However the results do 
not provide any evidence of a significant increase in disclosure in the post-FSA period 
as seen by the insignificant coefficients on the dummy variable DFSMA.  
 
The centre and final columns of Table 4 incorporate the quality of the news 
announcement as perceived by the market into the model. The model is fitted by 
replacing the total six month outlook frequency with the frequency of negative (centre 
columns) and positive news announcements (last columns). The results show that 
there is a negative and significant association between the frequency of significant 
negative news disclosure and the earnings surprise variable, i.e. when analysts predict 
earnings per share in excess of actual values, companies disclose more bad news to 
the market. The sign of the coefficients on the control variables are similar to those 
for total news and are in line with expectations. The coefficient of Year is positive, 
but is not significant at the 10% level. (though significant at the 13% level). The 
coefficient of DFSMA is not significant and therefore even though the results provide 
evidence of an asymmetry in disclosure practices there is no evidence to suggest that 
that managerial conservatism increased in the post-FSA period.   
 
The model for significant positive news shows that the coefficients on Surprise, 
MarketCap, Gearing and DFSMA are all insignificant. These results suggest that the 
early disclosure of positive news is not an important factor explaining managerial 
disclosure decisions.  The Year variable is the only variable that is positive and 
significant this along with the previous results suggests an increase in general 
disclosure pattern over time.  In models for both negative and positive news the 
coefficients of gearing are not significant which suggests that even though firms who 
have more debt in their capital structure disclose more information generally they do 
not exhibit a preference for a particular type of disclosure i.e. negative or positive 
news. 
 
Discussion 
Several aspects of the results reported in the previous tables are worthy of further 
comment. First of all the results reported in earlier studies are also evident in our 
research i.e. disclosure being related to size, analyst following and gearing and the 
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predicted sign on the variables adds to our confidence that we have controlled for 
other important factors that affect disclosure in our model.  
 
Overall the results provide us with evidence to reject Hypothesis 2 that managers are 
not affected by market expectations in choosing their disclosure practices. Indeed the 
results show that managers are biased in their disclosure practices in that there is a 
tendency to disclose more negative news when market expectations of earnings are 
higher than the realised year end earnings. However results from Table 3 point to a 
clear size effect i.e. firms in the FTSE 100 are observed to release more significant 
negative news than positive news, this is also supported by results in the regression 
model which show that there is a significant and positive relation between the 
disclosure of negative news and size while the same is not observed for the disclosure 
of positive news. While there is evidence of increased disclosure in the post-FSA 
period, after controlling for a linear increase in news, our results does not provide any 
evidence of statutory sanctions increasing the flow of timely voluntary disclosure and 
we therefore fail to reject Hypothesis 1. Previous work that examines the disclosure of 
earnings related news in the UK (Collet, 2004; Helbrok and Walker, 2003) focus on 
two primary factors affecting managerial disclosure practices, the litigation argument 
and the reputation argument. Our results provide strong support for the latter over the 
former, particularly because we observe that the predominance of negative news 
disclosure is more frequent among the larger firms that have a larger institutional 
investor base, larger analyst following and larger media coverage than other 
categories of the FTSE firms. Non-disclosure of price sensitive news particularly 
negative news is more costly for directors in larger companies given the larger 
institutional base, analyst following and media coverage.  
 
VI Conclusions 
 
Our paper examines whether managerial disclosure practices are influenced by market 
expectations of a forthcoming earnings announcement. The imposition of substantial 
civil and criminal penalties for the non-disclosure of price sensitive information in 
relation to the Financial Services and Market Act (2000) also provides us with an 
excellent opportunity to test whether corporate disclosure strategy is affected by 
legislation.  
 21
 
Our dataset comprises outlook statements released by constituent firms of the FTSE 
All Share Index over the time period 1994-1997 and 2000-2002. We use a market 
based SPC approach to classify news announcements into negative, neutral and 
positive statements. After controlling for the size, analyst following and capital 
structure of a company, our findings show that managers increase the frequency of 
disclosure when faced with the prospect of a negative earnings surprise while the 
same is not observed when managers are faced with a positive earnings surprise. 
Though the total number of news announcements has been constantly rising over the 
periods of study we do not find any evidence of an increase in disclosure associated 
with the specific period after penalties for non-disclosure were tightened.  Our 
findings leads us to suggest that reputation reasons play a bigger part than litigation as 
a driver of disclosure policy, this might be because unlike in the US launching a class 
action suit has been more difficult (Dedman, 2004) in the UK. 
 
We caution against concluding that the increased threat of litigation has not led to a 
significant change in disclosure practices. The short time period since the introduction 
of statutory sanctions is one limiting factor in this study. Nonetheless the evidence we 
have does not suggest a change in disclosure practices after the change in supervision 
of the UKLA. Future research can consider a longer time period to examine whether 
disclosure practices have changed in relation to new initiatives encouraged by the 
FSA such as the Transparency Directive.  
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Figure 1: Pattern in number of total outlook statements 1994 to 2002 
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Figure 2: Pattern in the number of outlook statements per company in the months 
before the earning announcement date 
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EPS day refers to number of news items on the day of the eps announcement 
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  Table 1: Distribution of news types by period 
 
RNS Type All news announcements News announcements in the 
six months prior to earnings 
announcement 
  Pre-FSA Post-FSA Total Pre-FSA Post-FSA Total 
Outlook Statements 36.2% 23.0% 11,938 20.8% 14.8% 2,958 
Business Event 15.7% 24.0% 9,198 20.1% 27.8% 4,492 
Acquisitions, Mergers & 
Disposals 
22.5% 17.4% 8,331 29.9% 19.4% 4,026 
Capital changes 4.4% 21.8% 6,903 4.5% 23.3% 3,071 
Board changes 20.1% 12.8% 6,626 23.3% 13.6% 2,951 
Company advisor & name 
changes 
1.1% 1.1% 471 1.4% 1.1% 213 
 14,759 28,708 43,467 5,940 15,055 17,711
News types are sorted by the overall frequency of occurrence 
The percentage of news items are shown as a fraction of the total for each period 
Pre-FSA covers the years 1994-1997 and Post-FSA covers the years 2000-2002 after the FSA was 
given its market powers. 
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Table 2: Summary of the total outlook statements and outlook statements per company by period and index for both negative, neutral, and  
market reaction 
   Total Percentage OTL's per company Difference 
Period Index N OTLs Neg Ntrl Pos Neg Ntrl Pos (Pos-Neg)
p-val 
Pre-FSA FT100 358 265 21.9% 64.9% 11.7% 0.16 0.48 0.09 -0.075 0.00
 FT250 807 386 17.6% 64.5% 17.6% 0.08 0.31 0.08 0.000 1.00
 Other 1,260 468 15.0% 66.0% 19.0% 0.06 0.25 0.07 0.015 0.16
 All 2,425 1,119 17.5% 65.2% 16.8% 0.08 0.30 0.08 -0.003 0.70
               
FT100 308 420 19.3% 67.6% 13.1% 0.26 0.92 0.18 -0.084 0.03Post-
FSA FT250 749 634 18.6% 63.4% 17.4% 0.16 0.54 0.15 -0.011 0.62
 Other 912 622 19.8% 63.3% 16.9% 0.13 0.43 0.12 -0.020 0.255
 All 1,969 1,676 19.2% 64.4% 16.1% 0.16 0.55 0.14 -0.026 0.042
The Pre-FSA Period Covers the years 1994-1997 and the post-FSA period covers the years 2000-2002 after the FSA was given market powers. 
N is the number of company years, and OTLs is the average number of outlook statements in each period and index. Based on the stock market reaction on the announcement 
of an OTL, the OTLs are divided into three groups: negative, neutral, positive. Mean is the mean price reaction for the days with OTL/no OTL by market reaction. Percentage 
is the fraction of the total number of outlook statements in each period and index 
Neg represents the most negative price reaction on day of the announcement; Ntrl represents a neutral price reaction on day of the announcement; and Pos  represents the 
most positive price reaction on day of the announcement 
Difference = Difference between the number of positive and negative outlook statements per company 
p-val is the probability that the difference in the number of positive and negative  is as extreme as that observed. Significant values for difference are highlighted in bold.
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Table 3: Summary of market reactions to news announcements 
 
Panel A: Pre-FSA Period 
   Average Excess Returns 
   Event day 1-5 days prior 1-5 days post 
Index OTL SPC Number Mean p-val Mean p-val Mean p-val 
         
All No Neg 70,350 -1.75 0.18  0.02  
  Ntrl 395,620 -0.05 0.00  0.02  
  Pos 73,397 1.96 -0.11  -0.13  
 Yes Neg 1,232 -4.7 <.001 0.40 0.65 -0.26 0.36
  Ntrl 2,548 -0.07 0.99 0.16 0.56 0.16 0.75
  Pos 1,538 3.83 <.001 0.08 0.67 0.49 <.001
FTSE 100 No Neg 10,321 -1.70 0.39  0.32  
  Ntrl 53,699 -0.03 0.00  0.01  
  Pos 10,829 1.82 -0.33  -0.31  
 Yes Neg 297 -3.16 <.001 0.36 1.00 -0.11 0.31
  Ntrl 454 -0.03 1.0 0.16 0.94 0.01 1.00
  Pos 249 2.78 <.001 -0.53 0.96 0.24 0.13
FTSE 250 No Neg 21,842 -1.69  0.06   0.02  
  Ntrl 120,542 -0.06  -0.08   -0.08  
  Pos 22,710 1.83  -0.18   -0.12  
 Yes Neg 403 -4.32 <.001 0.48 0.41 -0.11 0.99
  Ntrl 829 -0.13 0.62 -0.29 0.74 -0.16 1.00
  Pos 483 3.35 <.001 0.05 0.88 0.49 0.02
FTSE Small No Neg 38,187 -1.80 0.19  -0.06  
  Ntrl 221,379 -0.05 0.03  0.08  
  Pos 39,858 2.07 -0.01  -0.08  
 Yes Neg 532 -5.84 <.001 0.35 0.99  -0.45 0.56
  Ntrl 1,265 -0.05 <.001 0.45 0.06  0.41 0.25
  Pos 806 4.45 <.001 0.29 0.64  0.56 0.01
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Panel B: Post-FSA Period 
 Average Excess Returns 
   Event day 1-5 days prior 1-5 days post 
Index OTL SPC Number Mean p-val Mean p-val Mean p-val
     
All No Neg 64,675 -3.28 0.67  0.64  
  Ntrl 348,178 -0.03 0.18  0.10  
  Pos 65,056 3.65 -0.50  -0.30  
 Yes Neg 1,628 -8.39 <.001 0.05 0.04 0.65 1.00
  Ntrl 3,106 0.13 0.03 0.53 0.22 0.95 <.001
  Pos 1,810 5.97 <.001 -0.41 1.00 1.43 <.001
FTSE 100 No Neg 9,389 -3.47 0.88   1.01  
  Ntrl 46,820 -0.04 0.05   -0.02  
  Pos 9,505 3.66 -0.92   -0.81  
 Yes Neg 280 -5.74 <.001 0.19 0.57 0.29 0.54
  Ntrl 616 0.03 0.98 -0.23 0.91 0.12 1.00
  Pos 314 5.18 <.001 -0.66 0.99 1.31 <.001
FTSE 250 No Neg 23,071 -3.36 0.55  0.72  
  Ntrl 120,509 -0.03 0.09  -0.02  
  Pos 23,072 3.68 -0.66  -0.33  
 Yes Neg 638 -8.75 <.001 -0.59 0.00 0.84 1.00
  Ntrl 1,130 0.20 0.02 0.84 0.01 1.09 <.001
  Pos 687 5.91 <.001 0.16 0.08 1.46 <.001
FTSE Small No Neg 32,215 -3.17 0.70  0.47  
  Ntrl 180,849 -0.02 0.26  0.21  
  Pos 32,479 3.62 -0.26  -0.13  
 Yes Neg 710 -9.12 <.001 0.57 1.00 0.61 1.00
  Ntrl 1,360 0.12 0.65 0.61 0.78 1.19 0.00
  Pos 809 6.33 <.001 -0.78 0.63 1.45 <.001
The pre-FSA period covers the years 1994-1997 and the post-FSA period covers the years 2000-2002 after the 
FSA was given market powers. OTL is whether an outlook statement released on the day of interest. SPC is 
the market reaction on the announcement day, and by ranking these reactions the announcements are divided 
into three groups: negative, neutral, positive. Mean is the mean price reaction for the days with OTL/no OTL 
by market reaction. We computes the difference between the mean stock return on the days with an OTL 
compared to the mean stock return on the days with no OTL, conditioned on whether the market reaction is 
negative, neutral or positive. This difference tests whether the market reaction was significantly different for 
days on which there was an OTL compared to days where there was no OTL. P-val is the probability that the 
difference is as extreme as that observed.  Significant values for difference are highlighted in bold. 5-days 
prior (post) = Excess return for 5 days before (after) the day of concern.  
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Table 4: Summary of Poisson model parameters 
 Total  Negative  Positive 
Parameter B p-val  B p-val  B p-val 
Intercept -1.20 0.00 -2.60 0.00 -2.80 0.00 
DFSMA 0.07 0.52 -0.15 0.33 0.05 0.77 
ESurprise -22.00 0.01 -60.00 0.00 31.40 0.01 
No_Analysts 0.028 0.00 0.023 0.00 0.009 0.23 
MarketCap 6.50 0.00 5.80 0.07 4.77 0.21 
Year 0.065 0.00 0.150 0.00 0.069 0.02 
Gearing 0.0007 0.01 0.0004 0.40 -0.001 0.16 
         
R-sq 0.02   0.01   0.002  
No of Analysts is the number of analysts who issued earnings forecasts during the year for a firm on 
the I/B/E/S database. Market Cap is the mean market capitalisation over the year for the company 
Year is the year in which the earnings were announced. ESurprise is the difference between the 
consensuses forecast six months prior to the release of the EPS and the actual EPS standardised by the 
share price six months prior to the release of the EPS. Gearing is a firm’s total debt divided by total 
assets for a year. DFSMA is a dummy variable to indicate the second period. 
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